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tention against the owner and a right of preference against other
creditors. The articles do not limit the creditor to services rendered at the request or with the consent of the Owner. Storage
charges are generally accepted to be expenses of preservation.
In re Parking Service, Inc.' looks like a case of hardship
against the owner, but it clarifies the principle that the creditor
has a claim and privilege for storage charges regardless of a request or consent of the owner for the storage in question. On the
day that the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested a person
accused of a crime, they seized his two automobiles, which they
placed in storage. Later in the same day, the cars were sold to
the present owner, but their release to him was refused because
they were being held by the FBI as evidence. About ten months
later, the owner secured a release order from the federal court,
but he refused to pay the accumulated storage charges.
The court of appeal found that there was no privity of the
owner to any contract for storage and therefore there was no
liability or lien for the charges. 1 7 In reversing, the Supreme
Court maintained that the FBI had authority "to store the cars
taken by them as evidence at the expense of the owner and without his consent thereto."' 18 This might seem to make the decisive
issue whether the person ordering the storage had authority to
do so, and leaves the unasked question why the FBI should not
be responsible for the services which it engages. If the Civil
Code articles are applicable without the request or consent of the
owner, then it should not matter whether the cars were placed
in storage by the authority of the FBI or by a thief who had
stolen them in the first place.
PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
In matters of acquisitive prescription of ten years, a person
is presumed to possess the full extent of the property described
in his title.' In Agurs v. Holt 2 the court held that this presumption can be rebutted. In this case, there was undoubted identi16. 232 La. 133, 94 So.2d 7 (1957),
17. 88 So.2d 52 (La. App. 1956).

reversing 88 So.2d 52 (La. App. 1956).

1. 232 La. 133, 138, 94 So.2d 7, 9 (1957).
*Profesor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CrVL CODE art. 3498 (1870).
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fication by the parties of the tract of land to be conveyed, as
confirmed by the physical possession of this exact tract by the
purchaser. However, while the description and acreage in the
deed were correct, there was an error as to the starting point of
the measurements so that the location fixed in the deed was considerably to one side of the tract actually intended by the parties.
In the rebuttal of the presumption of full possession according
to title description due emphasis was placed upon the element of
"intent," making this rebuttal depend upon evidence that "no
such possession was intended." (Emphasis added.) The legal
possession required for acquisitive prescription must combine the
corporeal possession of the thing with the intent of possessing
as owner.4 Accordingly, if the deed of sale described more
property than the vendor thought he was selling, and the vendee
went into corporeal possession of only a part, he would still
have legal possession of the whole tract if it was his belief that
he purchased the tract as described and if he intended to possess
the whole as owner.5
The suit in question was an action for reformation of the
original deed, which the court classified as a personal action
subject to the general liberative prescription of ten years.6 The
significant feature of this prescription is that it begins to run
only when the error is discovered or should have been discovered
7
by due diligence.
Another problem of description for purposes of acquisitive
prescription came to attention in Bruce v. Cheramie.8 The difficult question to answer is just how far can the reference in
one deed be considered as incorporating descriptive details found
in another deed. Here the plea of prescription was based upon
a deed (1924) in which the description of the property included
the phrase "by the depth thereto belonging and appertaining,"
and on the preceding deed (1918) in the chain of title wherein
the corresponding part of the property description was "by
depth of survey and Patent." There was full corporeal posses2. 232 La. 1026, 95 So.2d 644 (1957).
3. Id. at 1042, 95 So.2d at 649.
4. LA. CzVyL COva art. 3436 (1870).

5. Id. art. 3437.

6. Id. art. 3544.
7. 232 La. 1026, 1040, 95 So.2d 644, 649 (1957).
& 231 La. 881, 93 So.2d 202 (1956).
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sion of all the land in question, and the specific issues were
whether the first deed (1918) constituted a "just title" and
whether the second deed (1924) was a sufficient link for tacking
onto the prior possession.
The majority decided in the affirmative and sustained the
plea of prescription. No firm generalization can be drawn because each case is enveloped in its own facts and surrounding
circumstances. It is interesting to note that the dissenting
opinion considered that the first deed did constitute a just title
but that the second deed was not sufficient for tacking because
it was considered as implying an intent to convey only the area
in depth to which there was good title so as to avoid any warranty responsibility. The argument was that if the purchaser
needs to consult other acts to determine the extent of his title,
it involves an examination of title; then he cannot plead good
faith if he failed to find the information that he should have
discovered concerning the defect. It is significant that the majority of the Supreme Court agreed with the district court. It
has been established (not without leaving some doubt) that a
quitclaim deed can serve as the basis for ten-year acquisitive
prescription, and the question of whether the facts and circumstances were such as to provoke a title examination can be argued
back and forth.
Another problem on which the evaluation of facts has to be
made in each case is the amount of activity which suffices to
constitute the corporeal possession necessary for the commencement of acquisitive prescription. The limited uses to which certain kinds of land can be put must constitute the standards for
decision. 10 In Boudreaux v. Olin Industries" it was held that for
timber lands possession was adequately established by the general and complete cutting of the timber, hauling out logs, as well
as marking and patrolling the boundaries. The court also cited
the sale of mineral rights and the grants of rights-of-way; these
would not per se constitute acts of possession, but the lessee's
mineral operations and the grantee's use of the passage do suffice to start a possession for the vendor and grantor. 2
9. Smith v. Southern Kraft Corp., 202 La. 1019, 13 So.2d 335 (1943), 5
LOUISIANA LAw Rzviw 484 (1943).
10. Veltin v. Haas, 207 La. 650, 21 So.2d 862 (1945) ; Chamberlain-v. Abadie,
48 La. Ann. 587, 19 So. 574 (1896).
11. 232 La. 405, 94 So.2d 417 (1957).
12. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3438, 3441, 3445 (1870).

